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Abstract 
 
In order to create a successful grid infrastructure, 
sites and resource providers must be able to publish 
information about their underlying resources and 
services. This information makes it easier for users and 
virtual organizations to make intelligent decisions 
about resource selection and scheduling, and can be 
used by the grid infrastructure for accounting and 
troubleshooting services. However, such an outbound 
stream may include data deemed sensitive by a 
resource-providing site, exposing potential security 
vulnerabilities or private user information to the world 
at large, including malicious entities. This study 
analyzes the various vectors of information being 
published from sites to grid infrastructures. In 
particular, it examines the data being published to, 
and collected by the Open Science Grid, including 
resource selection, monitoring, accounting, 
troubleshooting, logging and site verification data. We 
analyze the risks and potential threat models posed by 
the publication and collection of such data. We also 
offer some recommendations and best practices for 
sites and grid infrastructures to manage and protect 
sensitive data.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Grid computing has become a very successful model 
for scientific collaborations and projects to leverage 
distributed compute and data resources. It has also 
offered the research and academic institutions that host 
these resources an effective means to reach a much 
larger community. As grid computing grows in scope, 
and as an increasing number of users and resources are 
plugged into the grid, there is an increasing need for 
metadata services that can provide useful information 
about the activities on that grid. These services allow 
for more sophisticated models of computing, and are 
fundamental components of scalable grid 
infrastructures. The scope of these services is fairly 
broad and covers a variety of uses including resource 
selection, *monitoring, accounting, troubleshooting, 
logging, site availability and site validation. This list 
could grow, as grids evolve and other types of metadata 
become interesting to users and administrators. This 
means that it becomes important for a grid 
infrastructure to provide central collection and 
distribution points that can collate information gathered 
from multiple sources.  
The typical publication model involves pushing data 
from site based informational end points to central 
collectors, using streaming feeds or periodic send 
operations. The central collectors then make this data 
available to interested parties using standard interfaces 
and protocols in the form of web services and database 
query engines. The usability of the grid depends on the 
widespread availability of this information. Given the 
increasingly open nature of grid computing these 
collectors and information services generally present 
publicly accessible front-ends. 
Now consider the implications of this model for a 
site providing grid resources. Being included in a grid 
infrastructure means that a large amount of site 
information suddenly enters the public domain. This 
could include information deemed as sensitive or 
private from the perspective of the site, the user or the 
grid collaboration as a whole. It becomes very 
important then, to have controls on the access and flow 
of this data, so that the information sources can decide 
what data they want published and what data they want 
restricted. Since these models of informational flow are 
still evolving in today’s grids, these controls are still in 
the process of being designed into the software 
infrastructure. As such, there isn’t a standard way to 
control this flow of information. We think there is an 
urgent need to study the various vectors of information 
being provided by sites to grid infrastructures. This 
includes an analysis of the nature of the information 
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itself, as well as the software publishing this 
information. 
In our work, we use the Open Science Grid (OSG) 
as a case study for this model of information flow, 
looking at the five major information collection 
systems within the OSG, and analyzing the security 
implications of this infrastructure. We also provide 
some recommendations on improving the current 
infrastructure to preserve the privacy and security of 
sensitive information. 
 
2. The Open Science Grid 
 
The OSG offers a shared infrastructure of 
distributed computing and storage resources, 
independently owned and managed by its members. 
OSG members provide a virtual facility available to 
individual research communities, who can add services 
according to their scientists’ needs.  
It includes a wide selection of resource providers, 
ranging from small universities to large national 
laboratories. This broad range of sites results in a 
diverse set of security requirements. Reconciling these 
diverse security priorities is a challenge, and requires 
close interaction between the sites and the OSG 
managers. One approach to addressing this issue is to 
provide the necessary tools in the grid middleware 
stack, so that sites can configure security policies 
directly into the software. The OSG provides a 
software distribution called the Virtual Data Toolkit 
(VDT). This includes a packaged, tested and supported 
collection of middleware for participating compute and 
storage nodes, as well as a client package for end-user 
researchers.  
The OSG also provides support and infrastructure 
services to collect and publish information from 
participating sites, and to monitor their resources. 
These services are provided by the OSG Grid 
Operations Center (GOC). The GOC provides a single 
point of operational support for the OSG. The GOC 
performs real time grid monitoring and problem 
tracking, offers support to users, developers and 
systems administrators, maintains grid services, and 
provides security incident responses. It manages 
information repositories for Virtual Organizations 
(VOs) and grid resources.  
 
3. Information Collection in OSG 
 
There are currently five major information 
collection systems in the OSG, which rely on 
information feeds from sites to centralized servers. The 
following is a description of each of these services, and 
an analysis of the information being published by them 
from a site security perspective.  
 
3.1 Resource Selection Information 
 
In the OSG framework, the Generic Information 
Provider (GIP) gathers site resource information. GIP 
aggregates static and dynamic resource information for 
use with LDAP-based information systems. 
Information published is based on Glue Schema. The 
CEMon (Compute Element Monitor) service is 
responsible for publishing this information to a central 
OSG information collector service called the CEMon 
Consumer. CEMon connections are authenticated and 
encrypted (using GSI). This information is then made 
public in two ways: 
1. Class-ads are published to a Condor matchmaker 
service called the Resource Selection Service 
(ReSS), which allows Condor clients to select 
appropriate resources for job submission. 
2. The Berkeley Database Information Index (BDII) 
collects this information for resource brokering. It 
tracks status of each participating cluster in terms 
of available CPUs, free CPUs, supported VOs, etc. 
The Glue Schema provides a more detailed list of 
attributes supported in this scheme. For the purposes of 
this study, we concentrate on those attributes published 
by GIP that may be deemed sensitive by certain sites. 
This includes: 
• Operating System version/patch information 
• Authentication method (grid-mapfile, GUMS) 
• Underlying job-manager and batch system 
information 
• Internal system paths 
In some sense, publication of this information is 
essential to a site’s successful participation in the grid. 
However, a site must understand the implications of 
making this information public. Prior to joining the 
grid, much of this information was inherently under the 
control of the site, and limited to people under its own 
administrative domain. As such, administrators must be 
aware of any conflicts with the current site security 
policy and requirements that may have been drafted 
prior to participation in the grid.   
Additionally, a site may only want to provide this 
information up to a desired level of detail. Since the 
GIP software will publish all available information in 
its default mode, a site may want to consider limiting, 
or overriding some of the attributes being published. 
Another consideration is the public nature of this 
information, once it has been sent to the CEMon 
Consumers. Given that this information is only useful 
to actual users of the grid, it might be useful to provide 
some minimal restrictions so that the information is 
only accessible to current members of the OSG (or 
collaborating grids).  
 
3.2 Accounting 
 
The Gratia software provides the accounting 
framework for the OSG. Gratia consists of two 
components: 
1. The Gratia probes that run on the site resource and 
interface with the site-specific accounting and 
batch systems. These probes extract resource usage 
information from the underlying infrastructure and 
convert it into a common Usage Record-XML 
based format. This is then sent to a central 
collector. 
2. The Gratia collector is a central server operated by 
the OSG GOC that gathers information from the 
various probes, and internally stores this in a 
relational database. It makes this information 
publicly available through a web interface, in 
certain pre-defined views. The web interface also 
allows viewers to create their own reports and 
custom SQL queries against the usage data. 
The Gratia records include information that might 
be considered sensitive by both the sites and the grid 
users. Specifically, we identified the following 
information as potentially sensitive: 
• User account names 
• User DN information 
• Job file and application binary names 
Given that this information can be accessed through 
a public SQL interface, all user activity on the OSG 
can be traced and analyzed in fairly sophisticated ways, 
by anyone with a web browser.  
User account and DN information could be used by 
an attacker that has compromised an account on one 
site to query a list of sites with the same user 
account/DN, thus increasing the scope of the attack. It 
is not being suggested that masking this information 
will protect a site from a compromised account on 
another system. Certainly, once an account has been 
compromised, any other site that uses a common set of 
login credentials should be considered vulnerable. 
However, making this information less accessible to an 
attacker could mitigate the scope of the attack.  
Job file or application names would be less useful to 
attackers, but could reveal information about the nature 
of the jobs being run. There is the potential for a rival 
project to gain valuable clues about the research being 
done from this information. A researcher may want to 
restrict this information to a limited set of people. On 
the other hand, from an accounting standpoint, the 
underlying file descriptions may not be as interesting as 
the actual resource consumption being measured. In 
most cases, the accounting software only needs to be 
able to uniquely identify a job, and doesn’t care about 
the specifics of underlying job or application names.  
For these reasons, it is recommended that access to 
this data be restricted along user and VO lines using 
grid certificates as the mechanism for controlling this. 
Sites can also mask sensitive information by modifying 
the probe software to apply filters to the records. 
3.3 Logging 
 
The OSG uses Syslog-ng to provide centralized 
logging of user activity on the Grid. Syslog-ng is an 
extension to the Syslog protocol that provides more 
flexible support for distributed logging and richer 
content filtering options. 
Currently OSG resources optionally log all 
information related to Grid processes using syslog-ng, 
and send this to a central collector managed by the 
GOC. The primary uses for this information are: 
1. Troubleshooting – Being able to trace the 
workflow of a distributed job is very useful as a 
debugging tool for failures. It makes it 
significantly easier to detect how and why a job 
might be failing, especially when multiple sites are 
involved. The OSG GOC has a troubleshooting 
team to deal with such cases. 
2. Security Incident Response – Having centralized 
logs available to the OSG security team, makes it 
very useful to be able to analyze the scope and 
extent of a security compromise. It allows the 
GOC to identify compromised sites or users, and 
to judge the nature of the compromise. Affected 
sites can then be notified for rapid incident 
response. 
In the troubleshooting case, there is the need to 
protect failure modes from becoming publicly 
available, as this could reveal possible avenues for 
attack. For example, a poorly configured site may have 
vulnerabilities in the execution path. While not 
apparent through the standard client software, these 
may be exposed through syslog information. In general, 
logging information should only be available to 
authorized personnel within the OSG administrative 
domain, or to specific users when debugging problems.  
Another approach to this issue involves the level of 
logging performed by the site, so that only a minimal 
amount of information is logged by default. This 
translates to logging only the start and stop times for 
jobs and data transfers for a given user. In the event of 
a failure, the site can increase the level of logging, and 
work in conjunction with the troubleshooting team and 
the user to diagnose the specific problem.      
Security incident information is perhaps even more 
sensitive, and syslog information revealing incident 
details must have tight access controls. Once again, this 
points to restricting the information to an authorized set 
of security personnel.   
Syslog-ng allows for collectors on a per site basis, 
that can then filter out the information getting passed to 
the OSG wide collector. This would allow sites to 
collect detailed information internally, while filtering 
the information sent to the OSG. Any information sent 
to the OSG GOC should be encrypted. As long as there 
is enough information being sent to identify a failure or 
compromise at a central level, the relevant sites can be 
notified of this. The sites can then address the specifics 
of the problem, and provide more information to the 
OSG GOC and security team, as necessary. This is the 
model that is expected to go into production for future 
OSG deployments. 
 
3.4 Site Availability and Validation Data 
 
The OSG GOC performs site availability and 
validity tests on participating compute and storage 
elements, and publishes these results online. These tests 
are run at regular intervals, either using a Perl script 
(site_verify.pl) or using a customizable set of probes 
called RSV (Resource and Service Validation). The 
basic aim is to validate the services being advertised 
through the resource selection and monitoring modules 
(CEMon). Much of the information being collected 
here is analogous to CEMon information, and subject 
to the same issues. The RSV probes use a push model, 
similar to the Gratia service. The site_verify.pl script 
takes the form of a remote grid job run by the GOC at 
individual sites, relaying information back using the 
standard Globus data movement protocols (GASS, 
GridFTP). Possibly sensitive information being 
reported includes: 
• Account Names 
• Historical system availability information 
• Currently running software information 
• Internal System Paths  
Given that site validation data is both being 
collected at regular intervals, and being archived, it 
offers the ability to track the state of a system over 
time. This may provide information about regular 
system downtimes, when a system may be in a 
transitional state and particularly susceptible to an 
attack.  
Moreover, the archived nature of this information 
suggests that the site is subject to a “Google Hack”, 
even if system data is no longer been published. An 
attacker can use standard search-engine technology to 
scan the Internet for systems that match certain 
keywords. This can be used to scope out systems with 
known vulnerabilities based on advertised software 
levels. This is compounded by the fact that modern 
search-engines like Google do their own external 
caching and archiving of information, creating a 
situation where anything that is published on the web 
has the chance of persisting, despite a site no longer 
wishing to make that information publicly available. 
There are known methods to prevent a site form being 
listed in a search engine, and it is recommended to use 
these for this kind of data. 
3.5 Monitoring 
 
The OSG uses the CEMon software for monitoring 
sites. An analysis of this has already been included in 
the “Resource Selection Information” section.  
The OSG also supports an optional package called 
MonALISA (MONitoring Agents using a Large 
Integrated Services Architecture) to monitor system 
availability and load. Sites using MonALISA send 
system information to a central MonALISA service, 
which allows general users to query site information 
from a web-based clickable map interface. It monitors 
the following information: 
• System information for computer nodes and 
clusters. 
• Network information (traffic, flows, connectivity, 
topology) for WAN and LAN. 
• Performance of applications, jobs and services. 
• End user systems, and end-to-end performance 
measurements. 
Since this includes performance and load 
information for systems and networks, it could be used 
to determine whether a machine is susceptible to a 
Denial-Of-Service attack. In other words, it could be 
used to target systems that are running close to their 
maximum capacity.  
This type of information is, however, extremely 
useful to legitimate users of a grid - it helps them 
determine the optimal locations for their workloads. If 
possible, it should only be made available to grid users, 
without exposing it to the outside world. 
 
4. Summary of Security Risks 
 
So far we have identified the following pieces of 
information, that are published to the OSG, as being 
potentially sensitive to a site: 
1. Operating system and software level information 
2. Local account names 
3. Supported grid user DNs 
4. Underlying authentication methods 
5. Job-manager / batch-system information 
6. Internal system paths 
7. Job names 
8. Error and failure information 
9. System load and performance information 
10. User activity at the site 
11. Historical system availability data 
While much of this data is very important to users 
and VOs on the grid, and essential in creating a robust 
and flexible grid architecture, it is important to design 
the systems that publish this information such that they 
can support the desired level of protection for the data. 
In other words, information should be restricted to 
legitimate users of the grid, and sites should have 
ultimate control over what information they wish to 
publish, and at what level of detail.     
5. Recommended Grid Middleware 
Configuration 
 
While software may evolve, and the specific 
methods for configuring software may change, the 
general goals for proper middleware configuration 
remain the same. The following recommendations will 
help provide some amount of control to sites that wish 
to protect sensitive data: 
1. Override attributes that are considered sensitive 
with alternate values that can convey the 
equivalent information. For example the GIP 
allows named attributes to be overwritten by 
specifying them in a special file (alter-
attributes.txt). This could allow a site to replace 
detailed software levels with more generic 
information. 
2. Use site level collectors for multi-resource sites. 
This will allow the site to filter sensitive data at 
this level before forwarding it to OSG. Syslog-ng 
is designed with this sort of architecture in mind. 
3. Turn down level of detail for the published 
information to the minimum required – during 
troubleshooting efforts, this can be turned up for 
more diagnostic information. This limits the 
overall exposure of the site.  
4. Always use encrypted data streams and secure 
protocols to send information, instead of using 
clear text. Many OSG services, such as Gratia or 
Syslog-ng, offer both SSL and clear-text options to 
send data to their respective collectors. Sites 
should always use the former, when given a 
choice.  
 
6. Recommendations for Data Protection 
 
Additionally, it is in the best interest of the grid 
provider (OSG), to provide methods for protecting this 
data. This protection must happen in multiple ways: 
1. All grid infrastructure software that transmits or 
collects data from public networks should support 
secure and encrypted communication protocols. 
2. The software design should allow sites to override 
arbitrary attributes being published. 
3. Information collectors should endeavor to 
authenticate the machines that publish site data – 
only machines whose identities can be verified 
should be allowed to publish their information. 
This prevents third parties from publishing fake or 
invalid data for a given site. GSI host certificates 
are an effective way to achieve this kind of 
authentication. CEMon already uses this, and the 
model could easily be extended to other OSG 
collection services.   
4. Use of grid certificates to restrict access to data 
where possible. Web servers should attempt to 
verify the identity of the user before allowing 
access to grid resource information. Current 
technologies, (e.g. mod_gridsite for Apache based 
web servers) provide the ability to control access 
based on the user certificates. Additionally, this 
information could be restricted along VO lines, so 
that a VO is only authorized to access its own data. 
5. Prevent indexing or caching of dynamic site 
information on web servers by search engines. 
This can be done by using files like robots.txt to 
prevent search engines from storing this 
information. 
6. In the long run, there should be a concerted effort 
to consolidate software systems collecting similar 
information, so that site administrators and 
security officers have a single point of control for 
protecting such information. For example the 
Teragrid’s Inca monitoring system consolidates 
resource validation, troubleshooting and 
monitoring functionality under a single engine.  
Some of these features already exist in the OSG 
software, but there also needs to be a comprehensive 
effort to integrate these types of features across the 
middleware and collector infrastructure.  
 
7. Applicability to Other Grids 
 
While our work has largely been a case study on the 
OSG, the general principles of securing site 
information are applicable to any major grid 
infrastructure. Collection and publication of resource 
information is a common feature across grids, and 
results in similar requirements and goals with respect to 
protection of such information.  
Indeed, many of the discussed software systems are 
currently deployed in other grid infrastructures as well 
(e.g. CEMon and MonALISA at various EGEE sites). 
Other grids have their own information services 
providing equivalent functionality. The Teragrid uses 
the Inca monitoring system for resource availability, 
validation and monitoring purposes, collecting and 
publishing similar site information as that discussed in 
section 3. These systems face similar risks with respect 
to sensitive site information, and we expect the general 
techniques for protecting this information to be 
applicable as well. 
There is an increasing trend towards interoperability 
among grids, with international collaborations and VOs 
driving usage and infrastructure requirements. There is 
a shift away from centralized grid providers, towards 
integrated VO architectures, where a given VO frames 
its own usage model. This points to cross-grid 
collection services that operate on a per-VO basis. 
Since VOs work in close collaboration with the major 
grid providers, many of the current technologies 
discussed have uses cases for such VO based services. 
For example, the ALICE VO uses MonALISA to 
provide integrated monitoring of its supporting 
resources. This means that VOs must also take site 
security requirements into consideration as they build 
their grid information frameworks. 
 
8. Future Work 
 
The focus of this work has been on the OSG, and its 
tools, infrastructure and metadata. It would be useful to 
extend this analysis to other major grid infrastructures 
such as the Teragrid or EGEE, to understand how they 
approach issues pertaining to sensitive site-related 
information. This would highlight common problems 
and solutions, and provide alternative approaches 
towards protecting site data.  
Also, given that scientific collaborations are 
increasingly adopting the VO model of grid computing, 
where a VO maintains a certain amount of control over 
its own users and metadata, it would be interesting to 
analyze how VOs manage sensitive information, and 
how they publish and integrate this data across one or 
more grid infrastructures. 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
While a bulk of this paper has been devoted to the 
importance of protecting information that might reveal 
weaknesses in a site’s security infrastructure, this 
should not be taken as an endorsement of the “security 
by obfuscation” philosophy. We recognize that there is 
no substitute for hard security – regular fixing and 
patching of software, intelligent system monitoring, 
and strong security polices and practices are essential 
for a truly secure platform. However, practical security 
considerations demand that administrators account for 
the fact that not all vulnerabilities may be known at a 
given time. There may also be delays between the 
discovery and the patching of a vulnerability. Thus, it is 
prudent to minimize the amount of information 
available to a malicious entity and limit the extent of a 
compromise. While it is necessary to make certain 
kinds of information public for the success of open grid 
computing, it is also in the resource provider’s best 
interest to understand the risks involved in doing so. 
Since grid architectures tend to be as generic as 
possible, some of the published information may be 
extraneous. The site must find a balance between how 
much information it seeks to publish about itself, and 
how much information it wishes to protect. It may also 
want to limit the consumers of this information to a 
controlled set of persons.  
We believe that this paper would serve as a useful 
tool for sites that wish to identify these channels of 
information, so that they can determine the appropriate 
level of protection they wish to apply to their published 
data. We also hope to motivate further study and 
discussion on the protection of site information across 
various grid infrastructure and middleware providers. 
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